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“What makes my image of him into an image of him?”: Philosophers on film and the question of 
educational meaning 
 
The ideas informing this paper have been developed somewhat in tandem with preparations for a 
new module I am delivering to third year undergraduates on the subject of Film as Education. In 
thinking through the rationale for such a module, I was aware that I would have to address two 
issues: firstly, a critique of a particular mode of theorising that currently prevents against a broader 
educational reach of film in teaching; secondly, the ways that I believe film, unconstrained by this 
mode of theorising, can teach my students something about teaching and education itself. This 
paper attempts to address both issues, in an endeavour to take seriously the idea of film as 
philosophy, and film as a philosopher-teacher. 
Film’s current use in education: illustration and explanation 
My discussion proceeds from an intuition that film can be educational in a broader sense than its 
current use in classrooms or lecture theatres for illustrative purposes.  This is not to deny any 
evidence that using film illustratively in class can further engage student interest across disciplines. 
In recent years, books such as Math Goes to the Movies (Polster & Ross, 2012) and Teaching with the 
Screen (Leopard, 2013) have provided innovative examples of the informative ways in which 
moments in films can illuminate not just particular problems within certain disciplines, but also the 
practice of dealing with them. I myself use film illustratively in this way, but have noticed that this 
illuminating function does not necessarily differ from other illustrative modes of pedagogy (asking 
students to “Imagine that…”). For example, when I show the ‘two-boats’ scene from Christopher 
Nolan’s Batman film The Dark Knight (2008) to demonstrate Kantian or Benthamite approaches to 
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moral dilemmas, this is little more than a visual representation of the well-known ‘trolley problem’ 
thought experiment. The scene establishes a relationship between image and idea that has little to 
do with the film itself. This is because the video – the thing seen – is secondary to the pedagogic 
principle under discussion, and its effectiveness in illustrating the principle is therefore more 
dependent on an intervention on the part of a teacher, i.e. my explanation of what makes the ‘two 
boats’ scenario representative of a moral dilemma. 
Using film as an illustrative tool helps to explain an idea, because it renders that idea visible, 
becomes a representation of it. But the illustration of an isolated idea does not account for the 
whole experience of film-viewing, because its meaning relates to the principle under illustration, not 
to the meaning of the film as a whole. The experience of The Dark Knight viewed in its entirety and 
actuality cannot be reduced to any one scene, or a single governing idea (e.g. the conflict of moral 
codes). Film finds fuller expression not as the representation of something which transcends the 
activity within it, but as the presentation of many things to an audience whose perspective is 
governed by the context of viewing. Our appreciation of film is diminished when detached from its 
contingency, or when the internal coherence of theoretical interpretation supersedes the nuances of 
contingency in the areas to which it is applied. To adopt a filmic metaphor, blanket or blueprint 
applications of theory can risk “green-screening” the object of study, such that its meaning remains 
essentially the same whether against this background or that background.  
Wittgenstein objects to this essentialism in the Philosophical Investigations as follows: 
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“When philosophers use a word – ‘knowledge’, ‘being’, ‘object’, ‘I’, ‘proposition’, ‘name’ – 
and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever 
actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home? 
 What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.” 
(RPP, 1, §116) 
Any attempt to capture the essence of a thing as abstracted from its surroundings constitutes a 
disavowal of its actual meaning in use. The notion of essence, once the mainstay of phenomenology 
in its Husserlian formulation, was also called into question by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-
Ponty insisted that any essence of a thing was always conditioned by its existence in the world, 
meaning that any understanding of it was necessarily dependent upon the particular perspective of 
a perceiving subject, and in relation to everything else in what he called the “phenomenal field” (or 
“surroundings”, in Wittgensteinian terms). The illustrative instance, then, however useful, always 
risks reproducing this grasping at essences, a thing’s objective character, by abstracting from the 
wider existence, in which things occur – their subjectivity. 
The critique of psychologism 
To retrace the limits of the illustrative mode in education is to return to the critiques of 
psychologism offered by Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein in the mid-twentieth century, in the 
Phenomenology of Perception (first published in French in 1945) and Remarks on the Philosophy of 
Psychology (probably completed in 1949). According to Merleau-Ponty, there exists a fundamental 
fallacy in what he calls classical psychology, which he understands as the inheritance of Cartesian 
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and Kantian introspectionism. Descartes’ ‘Third Meditation’ sets the tone with a suspicion towards 
sensory perception as that which deceives the mind: 
“I am a thing that thinks, that is to say that doubts, affirms, denies, that knows a few things, 
that is ignorant of many, that wills, that desires, that also imagines and perceives; for…these 
modes of thought that I call perceptions and imaginations, inasmuch as they are modes of 
thought, certainly reside [and are met with] in me.” 
(Descartes, 1969, p.179) 
It is this first and last assumption, that of the cogito and its primacy, that characterises a shift 
towards an ingrained introspection in Western philosophy that Merleau-Ponty describes as the 
detachment of the subject from the world, “by showing that I could not possibly apprehend anything 
as existing unless I first of all experienced myself in the act of apprehending it” (2008, p.x). In 
establishing the mind as the only entity upon which a rational self could depend, the opening of 
Descartes’ eyes reveals for him not the world as it is (i.e. as a disorder independent of his existence), 
but a world of representation that is ordered by the mind that sees. The ‘pictures’ of the world are 
objects whose relation to the idea is one of a perfection that it can only attain via the thinking 
subject. The metaphysics of the image, then, is entirely abstracted from a world in which, according 
to Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty, it actually makes a lot more sense to say that we see things as 
they appear in the immediacy of our perception and in relation to each other, rather than in relation 
to an a priori idea of them. Why shut out the world in order to understand it, to divide it up into 
ideas that are not reflected in the actual experiencing of it? 
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The revolution in thought that takes place with(in) Descartes instates the mind as a self-governing 
entity: “I am a thing that thinks”. But the fallacy of the classical psychology, as Merleau-Ponty terms 
it, is twofold: one, that the world is composed as a “mosaic” of external facts and truths (i.e. 
separable and universal); and two, that I experience these facts and truths via sensations which my 
brain interiorises and makes sense of. Merleau-Ponty takes issue on both counts. He argues that the 
world always appears to us as a whole (the phenomenal field), not in its divisible elements, and 
sensation is not something experienced as an impression on the mind, but is a property of an object 
in relation to its surroundings: “This red patch which I see on the carpet is red, only in virtue of a 
shadow which lies across it, its quality is apparent only in relation to the play of light upon it, and 
hence as an element in a spatial configuration” (2008, p.5). The redness of the patch is not an 
essence that can be called red, but a matter of its being perceived in relation to other qualities of 
any given environment. To give expression to that quality of redness is only possible as a description, 
within those circumstances, rather than an explanation that can account for the essence of that 
quality. 
Similarly to Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology criticises the 
“tendency to explain” whereby the meaning of things somehow transcends the experiencing of 
them, not least because explanation relies on growth “from a certain germ”, the source of knowing 
that precedes the experience of things: 
“Mere description is so difficult because one believes that one needs to fill out the facts in 
order to understand them. It is as if one saw a screen with scattered colour-patches, and 
said: the way they are here, they are unintelligible; they only make sense when one 
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completes them into a shape – Whereas I want to say: here is the whole. (If you complete it, 
you falsify it.)”  
(RPP, I, §257) 
The implication, of course, is that to complete the scattered patches of colour, you would have to 
know the shape you wanted to form them into in advance, such that that the screen and its patches 
of colour are secondary to the shape – their meaning is predetermined by it. Wittgenstein here also 
points to the troubled inheritance of Cartesian thought: the possibility of a complete or final 
understanding in which thing and idea coincide in their perfect meaning. He indirectly alludes to 
both the intention of Descartes’ psychologism, and to the difficulty presented by not submitting to 
it.1 The former lies in the desire for making complete sense of things, with one of the most stabilising 
means to that end being the positioning of one’s own mind as the source of the logic and security of 
meaning; the latter, on the other hand, portends the indefinite destabilisation of meaning, and 
therefore a lack of control over it.  
The reduction of the “scattered colour-patches” of the world to divisible objects that are 
representations of ideas, effects an objectification in thought that allows for the individual mind to 
assume some control over the irreducibility of “the whole”. Wittgenstein does not explicitly cite 
Descartes as the origin of this attempt to control an understanding of the image by seeing it as 
representation of an idea (a “shape”), but rather critiques the possibility of this control on the 
grounds of its own faulty logic: just as Descartes is wrong to take his experience of his self as the 
source of understanding self in relation to the world, so “it would be just as wrong to use an 
                                                          
1
 Merleau-Ponty makes a similar observation in relation to the interpretation of texts: “Now if we rid our 
minds of the idea that our language is the translation or cipher of an original text, we shall see that the idea of 
complete expression is nonsensical, and that all language is indirect or allusive” (1964, p.80) 
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experience of meaning to explain the concept of understanding meaning” (RPP, I, §155). Why say 
that we have to understand vision before describing what it is we see? To set this kind of reasoning 
in motion is to set up precisely the dichotomy that both Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty seek to 
overcome: a dichotomy between things and our consciousness and expression of them, an 
opposition between inner and outer, subject and object. The resolution of this dichotomy for both is 
all too frequently to be found in theorising whose internal coherence seeks to control – rather than 
address – the external symbiosis between the coherence and chaos of phenomena. 
Psychologism and theory’s control over the visual 
The allure of controlling one’s own view of the world in this way has meant that Cartesian 
philosophy has contributed to an enduring psychologism within theorising itself (Standish, 2012). In 
using the term theorising, I have in mind that mode described by Nancy Bauer as the “attempt to 
describe and explain phenomena systematically in an internally consistent way that mandates or 
predicts what should or will happen in relevant future cases” (Bauer, 2015, p.106). From 
Wittgenstein’s point of view, the desire for explanation extends from, and leads back into, the same 
psychological cul-de-sac, the mind turning in on itself in reassurance of its own primacy of 
understanding (RPP, I, §212). On the surface of things, new theories can be developed in tune with 
different phenomena, but the underlying tautology remains unchanged, if theory isolates objects 
from their meaning in use or action. With regards to film specifically, Stephen Mulhall has observed 
that film theorists “exhibit a strong tendency to treat the films they discuss as objects to which 
specific theoretical edifices…could be applied” (Mulhall, 2002, p.6), whereby the object facilitates 
the coherence of the theory, rather than revealing something new about the object. Film theory can 
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only achieve this by isolating those elements within film that achieve this squaring of circles, rather 
than addressing an overall complexity that escapes reduction to any theoretical perspective. 
Common to the work of both Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty, then, is the emphasis on ‘the whole 
picture’ as the presentation of objects (words, images, other people) in relation to one another, and 
the impossibility of capturing that picture, or the essence of the phenomena that comprise it, 
completely. For Merleau-Ponty, this has to do with accepting that the world exists prior to our 
experience of it, and our bodies constitute an intervention in that world that makes experience of it 
possible – they are both objective fact and subjective possibility. For Merleau-Ponty, the experience 
of being a body makes meaning possible. If the mind were the source of meaning, and not the world 
to which the mind responds via the body, then it would have no need of expressing itself at all, as it 
would not need to seek meaning outside of itself: 
“We must reject that prejudice which makes “inner realities” out of love, hate, or anger, 
leaving them accessible to one single witness: the person who feels them. Anger, shame, 
hate, and love are not psychic facts hidden at the bottom of another’s consciousness: they 
are types of behaviour or styles of conduct which are visible from the outside.”  
(Merleau-Ponty, 1982, p.52) 
To make inner realities of things is to psychologise them, to create an illusion that analytical 
reflection somehow precedes the knowing of things, rather than knowledge proceeding from the 
perceiving of them. But Merleau-Ponty also notes that it is all too tempting to “pass from absolute 
objectivity to absolute subjectivity, but this second idea is not better than the first and is upheld only 
against it, which means by it” (2008, p.45). He makes the claim that subjectivity should not be seen 
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as the counterpart or flipside to objectivity, because this only culminates in an objectification of the 
subject. The critiques of an interiorised psychologism expose relations to the world which we see 
that are too often overdetermined or preconditioned by what it means to see (i.e. how we explain 
the act of seeing), or, to paraphrase Descartes, by what we think things mean before we see them. 
Both instances require the abstraction, either of the seer or the thing seen, that can’t account for 
the implication of both (their simultaneous subjectivity as well as objectivity) in the actual act of 
seeing.  
Meaningfulness in simultaneity 
A common theme in the work of both Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein is the ambiguity of words 
and images, or their simultaneous appearance. Here is the famous example from Wittgenstein: 
“Ought I to say: ‘A rabbit may look like a duck’? 
Would it be conceivable that someone who knows rabbits but not ducks should say: ‘I can 
see the drawing  as a rabbit and also in another way, although I have no word for the 
other aspect”? Later he gets to know ducks and says: “That’s what I saw the drawing as that 
time!’ – Why is that not possible?” 
(RPP, 1, §70) 
 
For those who know what both ducks and rabbits look like, it would be possible to argue that the 
image represents one animal or the other. Even if we were to grant that the image is indeed a ‘duck-
rabbit’, it is hard not to see it as now one thing, now the other. It is difficult to give expression to its 
simultaneity, even in the experience of it. And for someone who has never seen a duck, it is not 
"This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: GIBBS, A. (2016), ‘What Makes My Image 
of Him into an Image of Him?’: Philosophers on Film and the Question of Educational Meaning. 
Journal of Philosophy of Education, which has been published in final form at doi:10.1111/1467-
9752.12223. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms 
and Conditions for Self-Archiving."  
© 2016 Wiley-Blackwell  
 
 
possible to give expression to even the duality of the image, its ambiguity, even if it can be sensed. 
This does not mean that the image does not possess this duality, it is simply that the individual can 
only give expression to as much of it of which she has experience (it may be that such a thing as 
‘duck-rabbit’ exists out in the wild, though no one has seen it, in which case we are none of us able 
to give expression to that resemblance either).  
 
The experience of simultaneity frustrates an ability to account for it. Take this other – more 
embodied – example from Merleau-Ponty: 
 
“Movement and rest distribute themselves in our surroundings not according to the 
hypotheses which our intelligence is pleased to construct but according to the way we settle 
ourselves in the world and the position our bodies assume in it. Sometimes I see the steeple 
motionless against the sky with clouds floating above it, and sometimes the clouds appear 
still and the steeple falls through space. But here again the choice of the fixed point is not 
made by the intelligence: the looked-at object in which I anchor myself will always seem 
fixed, and I cannot take this meaning away from it except by looking elsewhere.”  
(1982, p.52) 
 
The “hypotheses which our intelligence is pleased to construct” are the abstractions and 
metaphysics to which we defer as ways of both binding our own experience to that of others, and 
thereby making the uniqueness of our own experience more bearable. But just as I cannot reduce 
the ‘duck-rabbit’ image to being one thing or the other through force of logic, so I am not in control 
of clouds or steeple as the fixed points of my perception. In exploring both the simultaneity of 
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experience and its non-reducibility to a single explanation, Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty are 
signposting a new direction for the meaningfulness of phenomena that is not dependent upon an 
idea stable enough for it to directly coincide with its meaning. Unlike Descartes, who needs to know 
the world before he experiences it through sight, Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty invite us to say 
what it is we experience in the act of seeing, however much we are frustrated by our ability to fully 
do so.  
 
‘Naming the prostitute’: the representation of philosophers on film 
Saying what we experience as meaningful can be difficult when we bring too many of what Merleau-
Ponty describes as ‘traditional prejudices’ – psychological prejudices that favour an objective, or 
metaphysical, explanation of phenomena – to bear on understanding. This is because traditional 
prejudices allow the viewer to distinguish parts from the experienced whole, when their meaning is 
contingent upon their being part of the whole. Film indulges these prejudices when it condescends 
to making visible, or representing, exactly what its audience wants to see, or what it thinks its 
audience knows in advance. In this, illustration resides not just in instances of a film, but extends to 
its entirety, with the consequence that the film either affirms, or falls short of, the object to be 
represented. Films about philosophers make an interesting study in this respect, as representation 
makes of the philosopher a psychologised being whose mind transcends his ‘Being-in-the-world’.  
Roberto Rossellini’s Cartesius, one of a trio of films about philosophers made as part of an explicitly 
didactic agenda, is exemplary in this regard. The film represents Descartes initially as a young man 
responding to an intellectual malaise among both the scientists and theologians of his time, all of 
whom were still in thrall to Aristotelian ideas of logic and the soul. His response might be interpreted 
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two ways: he is either the epitome of Robert Carlisle’s Great Man Theory, a uniquely charismatic 
individual that is compelled to intervene in the course of history for better or worse; or he is a 
product of his time, a necessary revolutionary brought into existence by the coordinates of 
intellectual history. The ambiguity is played out in the aesthetics as much as the characterisation: 
Descartes’ restless nomadism, his insistence on experiencing as many ‘real’ faces of Europe as 
possible, the microscopic attendance to realist detail in the mise-en-scène, the wars and pestilence 
that frame his interrogation of the human mind – these contingencies are all weighed against 
Descartes’ steadfast self-belief and stability of character, also reflected in the juxtaposition of his 
mode of dress throughout with that of the various costumes adopted by the others that he 
encounters.  Indeed, the other characters very much act out the roles of automata that Descartes 
suspected other people might be, and they even seem to say things solely for the benefit of setting 
up his rational critique.  
There is a sense throughout Cartesius, then, that Descartes is only struggling with how to articulate 
that which, in himself, he already knows to be true, rather than with the challenges to truth 
presented by the world and other people.  To view Rossellini’s Descartes through Cartesian eyes, 
then, is to witness him enacting the very psychologism that characterises the Meditations, in a 
manner perhaps not consistent with the didactic intent of the director. The physical presence of 
Descartes on screen becomes a distraction from the experience of the film as a whole, because he 
begs his own objectification, drawing the viewer’s attention away from its other parts. The dilemma, 
as Stanley Cavell calls it, is one of ‘naming the prostitute’: “You want Descartes to be there, but if 
you just say ‘This is Descartes’ you’ve killed it” (2005, p.191).  The more explicitly Descartes as a 
figure looms in the interpretation, the more he becomes an undesirable and immutable presence in 
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the conversation of ideas. Either he is the image of Descartes we had in our minds previously, or he 
falls short of that image. When Wittgenstein asks “What makes my image of him into an image of 
him?”, the answer is clear: “not its looking like him”. Wittgenstein is not interested with degrees of 
likeness or approximation, but rather what is meant by the image and how it is experienced.  
 
To teach Descartes by means of his representation on screen may therefore be a distraction from 
what we might learn about Cartesianism through film. Why is this so? Because likeness has no 
bearing on the way we experience the things we see; likeness corresponds to ideas already existing 
in our psychological make-up. 2 For the informed viewer, the success of the film’s meaning depends 
on its fulfilling their own preconceived understanding of what Descartes means as philosopher (what 
makes my image of him into an image of him is my idea of him); for the uninformed (Rossellini’s 
intended audience), the representation of an individual simply is an explanation of the meaning of 
that individual (if I have not seen either a duck or a rabbit, and I am told that the image is of a duck, I 
take the image to be that of a duck).   
 
Other films about philosophers are burdened with the same predicament: what the film might have 
to teach us about the way that thought emerges from its particular circumstances to effect change, 
is compromised by the concentration of meaning in one object. Everywhere in Cartesius and in 
Derek Jarman’s Wittgenstein, in Tariq Ali’s Spinoza (1994), Margarethe von Trotta’s Hannah Arendt 
                                                          
2 This problematic is also in evidence in Derek Jarman’s Wittgenstein, which dispensed with a realist script 
originally put forward by Terry Eagleton, and proffered a more abstract interpretation of Wittgensteinianism, 
with brightly coloured characters being played off against a black background. Jarman’s attempts to nullify the 
reduction of his film to biography or philosophy – “My film does not portray or betray Ludwig. It is there to 
open up” (p.67) – do not escape the problem of foregrounding the philosopher over the film as entity. 
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(2012), or even Kirby Dick’s documentary film Derrida (2002), the image of the philosopher is already 
oversubscribed in terms of meaning by preconceptions concerning their representation, such that 
the viewer feels compelled to reduce it/them to one interpretation or another, to its essence.  
 
Objectifying the subject of film theory 
The presence of the philosopher overwhelms the philosophical meaning of film, because it 
concentrates that meaning in objective representation on the screen. However, the meaning of film 
can be compromised by the theoretical approaches to film also, when they act as a deterministic 
authority over film experience. Laura Mulvey’s seminal essay on ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema’ continues to be influential enough in film studies to warrant its use as an example here.3  
Mulvey’s feminist-psychoanalytic critique of Hollywood cinema rests on the charge that its camera 
and its characters are complicit in the enactment of a ‘controlling male gaze’, which reduces all 
women in its films to passive objects. The idea is easy enough to illustrate by means of a scene from 
the James Bond film, Dr No: I, the viewer, observe Bond asleep on a beach, only to hear the sound of 
someone singing. Because I don’t know the identity of the singer, I immediately identify with the 
character who is also deprived of that information, Bond, who awakes to the siren call and looks 
around to discover its origin. I follow his searching gaze, and the thought process it implies, until it 
lights upon the figure emerging from the sea. The change of expression on Bond’s face registers his 
delight and his fulfilled desire, thereby doing so for the viewer also. The fact that the woman 
remains unaware of Bond’s presence evidences her lack of consciousness, an inability to exercise her 
own gaze as the object of one – the gaze of the male lead, which directs my own. In this scene Bond 
                                                          
3
 Oxford film philosopher Andrew Klevan describes Mulvey’s essay as “perhaps the most studied and cited in 
the history of film scholarship” (2014, p.147). 
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enacts his own cruder version of the Cartesian awakening, opening his eyes to discover that his inner 
knowledge that women exist for him is confirmed in the reality of a woman appearing to do just 
that. 
By means of the psychoanalytic theory, Mulvey is able to reveal evidence of the male gaze in any 
number of films. The thesis demonstrates the ways in which the male gaze not only subjugates 
women within films, but invites a female audience to submit to the patriarchal order which the 
visual pleasure of cinema imparts. Female subjectivity is suppressed through objectification, 
whether for the male or female spectator. But what is not acknowledged in this analysis of social 
control, is the way that the analysis exercises its own form of control over film interpretation. The 
theorist also enacts the Cartesian awakening, this time to a world in which everywhere film acts as 
the automaton of the male gaze dressed in cinematographic hats and cloaks. The enlightened 
theorist can’t help but position the spectator as passive and impressionable object, whose only way 
out of susceptibility is to be alert to the theory beforehand, to do as Descartes, and ‘think before 
one sees’.  
According to Nancy Bauer, Mulvey fails to “trust the power of the camera to surprise us when it 
comes to the question of what it’s possible for something or someone to become on film” (2015, 
p.159). If we don’t trust the camera to surprise us, then we also don’t trust ourselves to be 
surprised, to learn something new. For Mulvey, the internal coherence of her theory depends on 
seeing the spectator as the object of an objectifying gaze. Mulvey thus reproduces the Cartesian 
scepticism that prevents him from seeing other beings as more than automata; the only hope for 
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subjectivity is the intervention of an enlightened theorist able to explain phenomena according to a 
single rule.4  
The articulation of simultaneity goes some way in attesting to, if not motioning beyond, tendencies 
towards metaphysical abstraction in the theorising of either the object or the subject – whether in 
philosophy, film, education, or other disciplines. Mulvey’s theory, for example, loses its purchase on 
coherence if the viewer is seen as both object and subject, points in perception that change 
depending on how long you linger upon them. The spectator would have to be seen as someone 
who exercises and returns their own gaze(s) over cinema as well as being submitted to the director’s 
objectifying gaze via the cinematic medium.  
 
Film provides an interesting intervention here when it can provide examples of this simultaneity, 
provided that its own simultaneity (as object and subject), as well as that of its viewer, is upheld. 
Film does not just exist to be seen, understood and explained, but to teach the viewer how to see 
differently. This is to suggest that the film must be seen as something that thinks as well as 
something that conveys the thoughts and ideas of, say, its director. Experiences of both wonder and 
disturbance (the frustration of the objectifying cogito) that can result from the encounter with 
simultaneity thereby signal the broader philosophical and educational reach of cinema beyond its 
illustrative function. Film, when not reduced to component parts seen as representative of particular 
ideas, is revealed as a medium in which not just some things carry meaning, but – in Stanley Cavell’s 
words – “everything matters – and you do not know what everything means” (p.169).  
 
                                                          
4
 There are parallels here to be drawn between Mulvey’s theory and Paulo Freire’s pedagogy of 
conscientização. 
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Film as ‘doing’ philosophy 
What films about philosophers and films that are viewed under the burden of theory have in 
common is that they reduce the experience of film to stable, static, essences, whereas there exist 
strong arguments to look at film instead as philosophy in motion, in action (an important point of 
difference from, say, painting). Stanley Cavell provides an unusual example of how Cartesianism, or 
at least something of its logic, can be played out through film without the aid of the philosopher 
incarnate.  In Frank Capra’s Mr Deeds Goes to Town, a seemingly naïve young man from small-town 
America suddenly inherits an enormous fortune. In order to settle the finances, he has to go to New 
York, where he discovers a world full of superficiality, of cutthroats and capitalist zealots, all of 
whom seem to abide by the same logic of disenchantment that supports an unhappy and unhealthy 
society (Deeds notes on arrival that “They work so hard at living they forget how to live”). But whilst 
at every turn people seek to take advantage of a man they assume to be simple, Longfellow Deeds 
counters their opportunism with questions that derail in their simple reasoning. This can only occur, 
Cavell contends, not because Deeds is possessed of a mind superior in its rationality prior to his 
arrival in New York, but because the world that New York presents forces him to make sense of it. In 
the figure of Deeds, a figure only made possible through his interaction with others, Cavell discerns 
not Descartes himself, but the spirit of Cartesianism, or the ‘rediscovery of philosophy’.    
 
What we witness in Mr Deeds Goes to Town is less the confirmation or rejection of the assumptions 
we bring to bear upon it (Is it representative? Is it attempting to control my worldview?), and more 
the playing out of philosophical questions in the face of assumptions made by those on the screen: 
how do we discern non-sense when we encounter it? How do we respond to the irrationality of 
others, especially when it masquerades as accepted reason? Where the literal representation of 
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philosophers on screen invites the viewer to invest in their privileged psychology, to follow 
Longfellow Deeds’ journey is to see him change in response and relation to others, some of whom 
assume this privileged psychology, others with whom we are invited to sympathise as being flawed 
in the same way that we know ourselves to be. The interrelations between all characters and their 
environment, as presented by the film’s particular perspective on the world, are exposed in their 
simultaneity, not in the way they orbit, or are an extension of, a singular mind (Frank Capra’s or Gary 
Cooper’s). Merleau-Ponty describes this filmic experience as a montage whose expressive force “lies 
in its ability to make us sense the coexistence, the simultaneity of lives in the same world, the actors 
as they are for us and for themselves” (1982, p.55). 
 
The coexistence and simultaneity of things on film do not lend themselves to explanations of the 
revealed kind as in Cartesian psychology. The case for film as philosophy is instead made on the 
basis that film can think philosophy (or philosophically) on screen, a form of thinking out loud that 
can be taken as ordinarily meaningful as speech or conversation itself. It is this face value that 
Merleau-Ponty also asserts in ‘Film and the New Psychology’, when he says that “the film does not 
mean anything but itself” (1982, p.57). The film will mean significantly more once we have let go of 
the assumption that what we are to be told resides in the mind of its director, or of a central 
character. Equally, the suspicion that film is trying to do something to us loses the totality of its 
control if we acknowledge that we too have designs on it, but that the reciprocity and simultaneity 
that are all part of the film-viewing process can illuminate and disturb those assumptions that we 
take for granted: “film awakens as much as it enfolds you” (Cavell, 1979, p.17). Cavell finds that the 
value of film lies not its ability to represent the meaning of things, but to present a meaningful world 
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(Cavell, 1979, p.25), one whose irreducibility to its component objects demands a revaluation of 
meaning according to the whole.  
 
Conclusion: the film as educator 
In the last part of this paper, I want to return to the pedagogical import of film alluded to at the 
beginning. I spoke about the use of the ‘two boats’ scenario from Christopher Nolan’s Batman film, 
The Dark Knight, as an example of how film images can be used to illustrate particular points in 
education. But such examples, I suggested, say nothing of the very different experience of watching 
the entirety of The Dark Knight. The way I put it, the illustrative use of video in education lent itself 
to a direct coincidence between thing and its meaning. The illustrative mode is therefore one of 
contriving and explaining that coincidence for instructive purposes, attempting to control meaning in 
the image but saying nothing of our actual experience of it.  
 
The critiques of psychologism offered by Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty are critiques of 
explanation according to a rule, because of its assumption of a knowable object. Their discussions of 
ambiguity and simultaneity show how significant a part perspective plays in any one understanding 
of a phenomenon, and how therefore it is important that neither the phenomenon, nor the 
perceiving mind, is treated as wholly object within its given circumstances. This is not to effect the 
swing towards a science of subjectivity or relativism, but just to assume that subjectivity plays a part 
in assuring that perspective cannot, as Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty both observe, ‘complete’ 
the image or text.  
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Meaning, Merleau-Ponty says, is “the total movement of speech” (1964, p.80), and not just its 
component parts. The meaning of a lecture is in its content, and its mode of delivery, and the 
interaction between lecturer and students; the meaning of film lies also in its narrative, its directorial 
style and cinematography, and the interaction between characters and their environment. But as 
with the lecture, it is the simultaneity of things as they are presented (not represented), in the 
immediacy of that event, that constitute the experience of the film. That is to say, they are things 
that happen on a screen, but at a particular time and place for particular people. 
 
Film’s subjectivity means it will always resist the ‘completion’, or explanation, of the meaning of its 
images according to any one theory – not least because it is populated with phenomena, with 
objects, that call attention to “their conspicuousness, their obtrusiveness, and their obstinacy” 
(Cavell, 1978, p.250). The fact that they do this in motion is an active reminder of their resistance to 
completion, as only freeze-framing allows for the capturing of an essential idea. Cavell describes this 
quality of motion pictures as one whereby film “lets the world happen” (1979, p.25), and if we 
accept that as viewers we cannot control how it does that, then our response will always depend 
somewhat on the circumstances and perspective of viewing. These responses fall into the category 
of what Stanley Cavell calls ‘film criticism’, the conversation about film (its description) that he sees 
as emerging from responses to the film itself, rather than as impositions of theoretical lenses upon 
it. This is not to say that the language employed by theory is not also common to that which 
facilitates criticism. But criticism is an expression of meaning as it is experienced, as opposed to 
meaning as somehow concealed (in the mode of production, in the male gaze, etc.). As such, the 
critic is able to give expression to the simultaneity of things, to take responsibility for articulations as 
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ones that don’t appeal to the higher authority of theory, and invite the responses of others in the 
process.   
 
Films can only generate criticism if they are seen as “letting a world happen”, in its simultaneity of 
coherent objects and the subjectivity that threatens to undermine that coherence (scepticism). If we 
hold that pedagogy is more than just curriculum or method of delivery, then we can start to see how 
film might act as pedagogue also: it has the potential to present worlds to students that do not 
directly coincide with the education of their experience, that do not condescend to theory to explain 
that experience, and can ask valuable questions of that experience and the meaning of education in 
the process. Allowing film to act as teacher is a reminder to relinquish control over teaching – letting 
education happen – which can only take place if those teaching relinquish some control over the 
visual, what it means to see. To ask Cartesius to teach Cartesianism cannot have quite the intended 
effect here, for reasons aforementioned: the representation of Descartes enacts precisely Cavell’s 
issue of ‘naming the prostitute’ in its didacticism.  
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